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Abstract: In this paper, I identify a theoretical and political role for ‘white ignorance,’ present 
three alternative accounts of white ignorance, and assess how well each fulfills this role. On the 
Willful Ignorance View, white ignorance refers to white individuals’ willful ignorance about 
racial injustice. On the Cognitivist View, white ignorance refers to ignorance resulting from 
social practices that distribute faulty cognitive resources. On the Structuralist View, white 
ignorance refers to ignorance that (1) results as part of a social process that systematically gives 
rise to racial injustice and ignorance of this kind, and (2) is an active player in the process. I 
argue that, because of its greater power and flexibility, the Structuralist View better explains the 
patterns of ignorance that we observe, better illuminates the connection to white racial 
domination, and is overall better suited to the project of ameliorating racial injustice. As such, 
the Structuralist View should be preferred. 
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Introduction 
There appears to be a considerable gap between Americans’ perceptions of racial 
injustice and the reality of racial injustice in the United States today. Only 61% of white 
Americans agree that Blacks are treated less fairly than whites by the criminal justice system, 
despite evidence suggesting that Black Americans are more likely to be stopped, searched, 
handcuffed, and arrested than white Americans, and more likely to receive harsher sentences for 
similar crimes.1 In the financial domain, respondents estimated that Black families earn $85 for 
every $100 that white American families earn, and hold $85 for every $100 that white families 
																																																																		
1 Even when controlling for factors such as crime rates, and racial and socioeconomic 
demographics. See (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006), (Starr & Rehavi, 
2013), (Hetey, Monin, Maitreyi, & Eberhardt, 2016), (Commission, 2018), (J. Horowitz, Brown, 
& Cox, 2019).	
   
 
hold in family wealth.2 In reality, the gap is much larger: Black families only earn $57.30 for 
every $100 earned by white families, and hold just $5 for every $100 in white family wealth.3 
When it comes to lending, only 38% of whites (and 74% of Blacks) think that Blacks are treated 
less fairly than whites when applying for a loan or mortgage when in fact, a 2018 analysis 
revealed that Blacks applying for home loans were 1.8 to 5 times more likely to be denied than 
whites in 48 cities across the country, particularly in the South.4 The apparent gap between 
perception and reality is even worse when it comes to health: only 26% of whites (and 59% of 
Blacks) think that Blacks are treated less fairly than whites when seeking medical treatment, and 
yet a 2017 National Healthcare Quality and Disparities Report shows that the medical care that 
Blacks receive scores lower on 40% of health care quality measures as compared to the care that 
whites receive.5 Altogether, these gaps between what people believe and what the evidence 
suggests indicate that there is widespread ignorance about the state of race and racial inequality 
in the United States, particularly on the part of white Americans. 
Of course, it is a banal fact that ignorance abounds. We are beings with limited time, 
energy, perceptual access, technological skills, and cognitive resources inhabiting a vast and 
complex universe that far exceeds our epistemic capacities. Ignorance, then, is needfully 
pervasive. 
Nonetheless, the inevitability of ignorance in general does not mean that we should 
always respond to particular instances of ignorance with a shrug. There can be both theoretical 
and practical reasons for caring about ignorance. Ignorance is theoretically interesting, for 
																																																																		
2 (Kraus, Rucker, & Richeson, 2017).	
3 (Kraus et al., 2017).	
4 Even when controlling for various economic and social factors such as applicant’s income, loan 
amount, ratio between loan amount and applicant’s income, type of lender, racial makeup of 
neighborhood, and median income of neighborhood. (Glantz & Martinez, 2018), (J. Horowitz et 
al., 2019).	
5 ("2017 National Healthcare Quality and Disparities Report," 2018), (J. Horowitz et al., 2019).	
   
 
instance, if it is patterned in surprising and distinctive ways. At the same time, ignorance can 
have bad consequences, ranging from the mildly inconvenient to the utterly devastating; and 
sometimes there are facts that an agent should know.6 Thus, for various practical, moral, and 
theoretical reasons, ignorance sometimes merits sustained consideration. 
‘White ignorance’ is meant to capture one of those forms of ignorance that merit our 
consideration for both theoretical and practical reasons. Epistemologists of ignorance have 
coined the term ‘white ignorance’ to refer to patterns of ignorance— like the ones I started off 
with—  that are not merely coincidental or easily ascribable to the limits of finite beings, but 
instead systematically emerge from our social practices and are importantly related to the 
persistence of racial inequality.7 White ignorance is, further, of great practical and moral concern 
because it has bad consequences: it plays a role in sustaining racial injustice. As such, I take the 
point of theorizing white ignorance to be to elucidate the epistemic dimensions of systemic racial 
injustice; the goal is to provide a clear account of white ignorance that will serve as an effective 
tool for diagnosing and critiquing the epistemic dimensions of white racial domination.8 
Accordingly, the central question of this paper is how we should conceptualize white ignorance 
so as to best aid the fulfillment of the relevant political and theoretical aims. 
Despite being frequently invoked in critically-oriented discussions, direct theorizing of 
“white ignorance” has largely been neglected. As it stands, Mills (2007) provides the most 
																																																																		
6 See (Smith, 1983, 2016), (Rosen, 2008),  (Goldberg, 2018).	
7 The term “white ignorance” is due to (C. Mills, 2007). See  also (Alcoff, 2007), (Outlaw, 
2007), (Spelman, 2007), (Medina, 2013), (Charles W Mills, 2015), (Fricker, 2016), (Bailey, 
2017), (Woomer, 2019).	
8 By “white racial domination” I mean, roughly, a state of affairs in which there is a system of 
racial oppression that arranges racial groups into a hierarchy of social power and access to 
material benefits, with whites at the top of the hierarchy. I am assuming here that racial injustices 
are best understood as being structural and systematically linked such as to constitute racial 
oppression, and more specifically, white racial domination. Although I do not believe much 
hangs on it in this paper, like (C. Mills, 2007), I favor a social constructivist account of race.	
   
 
extensive discussion of white ignorance. He does not provide an account of white ignorance, 
however, but rather “gesture[s] toward some useful directions for mapping white ignorance and 
developing, accordingly, epistemic criteria for minimizing it.” Until now, that mapping has not 
been done.9 Clear presentations of a substantive account of white ignorance are missing, as are 
evaluations of possible accounts.  
In this paper, I take up the project of determining how we should develop the notion of 
white ignorance to best aid our political aims. To accomplish this, I do three things in this paper. 
First, I consider the purpose of having a concept of white ignorance, and use this to develop 
desiderata for an account. Second, drawing on examples found in the literature, I offer 
reconstructions of two seemingly popular positions— the Willful Ignorance and Cognitivist 
views— and evaluate them with respect to the desiderata. In so doing, I provide not only the first 
explicit articulation, but also the first critical evaluation of an account of white ignorance. Third, 
I propose a new account— the Structuralist view— that analyzes white ignorance in terms of its 
connections to the social structural processes that generate and sustain white racial domination. 
Ultimately, I will argue that, as compared to the alternatives, the Structuralist account better 
accounts for the patterns of ignorance that we observe, better illuminates the connection to white 
racial domination, and is better suited to the project of ameliorating racial injustice. 
 
1. Methodology 
Before I begin to assess accounts of white ignorance, I want to clarify the nature of the 
project. I want to begin by noting what I am not doing in this paper.  
First, I am not providing an analysis of our ordinary concept of ‘white ignorance.’ For 
																																																																		
9 The literature largely consists of very brief characterizations of white ignorance in the context 
of discussing some related topic. (Alcoff, 2007), (Spelman, 2007), (Medina, 2013), (Fricker, 
2016), (Woomer, 2019)	
   
 
one, there appears not to be an ordinary concept on which I could perform such an analysis. But 
even if there were, my aim is not to pin this down.  
Second, I am not providing a causal analysis of empirical phenomena. Causal 
relationships do play important roles in the accounts that I will be discussing, and I will stipulate 
that certain causal relations hold in fictional examples as a way of providing concrete 
illustrations of these views. I hope it will seem plausible that similar relations might hold for 
their real-world counterparts, but I do not intend to settle this from the armchair. 
The project I am engaged in is one of theory-building. The aim is to determine how we 
should develop the concept of white ignorance in order to best serve our practical and theoretical 
aims. Ultimately, this is part of a larger project of theorizing (racial) oppression, which is itself 
part of a larger political project aimed at reducing and ultimately eliminating (racial) oppression. 
The role of theory-building in this context is to develop conceptual tools that will be useful for 
the political project insofar as they make room for, draw attention to, and help elucidate 
phenomena that play an important role in sustaining racial oppression.  
As such, the inquiry that I am performing when asking “what is white ignorance?” is 
normative.10 I am interested in how we should conceptualize ‘white ignorance’ in order to best 
inform the political project of ameliorating racial oppression. It may help to contrast this with a 
moral approach. If the goal here were to identify what is morally objectionable about certain 
patterns of ignorance, then our theorizing should draw attention to and help us distinguish 
between certain normatively relevant features such as individual control, how easy it would have 
been to achieve knowledge, etc. In contrast, here it may be appropriate to direct our attention to 
patterns of ignorance for which no one is blameworthy. The change in ends calls for a 
																																																																		
10 As such, the project bears an important resemblance to ameliorative analyses. The key 
difference is that an ameliorative analysis begins with some concept that already plays an 
important role in our thinking. See (Haslanger, 2000, 2005, 2012), (Manne, 2017).	
   
 
corresponding shift in attention. Note that in engaging in this kind of normative theorizing, it is 
important to avoid an analysis that, in the desire to prescribe solutions, is too narrow or 
oversimplified.11  
These big-picture considerations give rise to four central desiderata for an account of 
white ignorance. An account of white ignorance should: 
 
(1) Account for important patterns of ignorance about matters pertaining to race and 
racial inequality. An account of white ignorance should be able to account for observed patterns 
of ignorance, and features of those patterns of ignorance, that play an important role in white 
racial domination. More specifically: 
1a) For any particular pattern of ignorance, the account should be able to make sense of 
why ignorance about that matter is so widespread.  
1b) The view should be able to make sense of  demographic trends in the distribution of 
ignorance. For instance, in many cases (like examples I started with), white individuals are more 
likely to be ignorant about some matter relating to racial inequality than non-whites are.  
1c) An account of white ignorance should be able to make sense of the form(s) that these 
patterns of ignorance take— whether it be false belief (e.g. falsely believing that Black American 
families earn $85 for every $100 that white American families earn), suspension of judgment 
(e.g. suspending judgment on whether racism is still a live problem for people of color in the 
United States),12 or lack of belief (e.g. lacking any sort of belief about redlining, because one has 
never even heard of it.13 Moreover, if there are interesting patterns in the contents of the 
ignorance— for instance, people are arriving at false beliefs with the same contents— the view 
																																																																		
11 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point.	
12 (Friedman, 2013)	
13 Redlining refers to discriminatory lending practices. (Coates, 2014), (Rothstein, 2017).	
   
 
should be able to account for this. 
1d) White ignorance is often taken to be a paradigmatic instance of ignorance that is 
active, or resilient and difficult to eradicate.14 An account of white ignorance should be able to 
make sense of this resilience.  
 
(2) Help account for the persistence of white racial domination. Again, the point of theorizing 
about white ignorance is to help elucidate how patterns of ignorance help sustain white racial 
domination. In particular: 
2a) The view should provide extensional coverage. That is, if there is a case that helps to 
explain the persistence of white racial domination (as indicated by empirical analysis), then the 
view should identify this as a case of white ignorance. 
2b) One notable feature of white racial domination is its stability and resistance to 
change. A view of white ignorance will do better if it is better able to help account for this 
persistence and stability. 
 
(3) Accommodate the ways in which social practices give rise to patterns of domination-
sustaining ignorance.  If empirical analysis suggests that there is an important way in which 
social practices give rise to patterns of domination-sustaining ignorance, then this should be 
captured by the view of white ignorance— I refer to this as providing explanatory coverage. 
Explanatory coverage is important because we should not fail to attend to, and thereby risk 
failing to intervene on, practices that play an important role in sustaining white racial 
domination. This is connected to the need to ensure that the result of our normative analysis does 
not paint an overly narrow or simplified picture of white racial domination. 
																																																																		
14 (Alcoff, 2007), (C. Mills, 2007, p. 13), (Medina, 2013), (Woomer, 2019, pp. 1-2).	
   
 
 In addition to these desiderata, views may have additional practical or theoretical costs 
and benefits. For instance, some views might offer additional explanatory power, provide greater 
suggestions for intervention, or suggest a means of motivating individuals to take action. Insofar 
as these advance the broader aims of the project, I will take them to count in favor of the view, 
and vice versa. 
Lastly, I want to emphasize a separate point about the scope of the project. Like Mills 
(2015), I take it that, given the history of European colonialism, white ignorance will be found 
across national and inter-national contexts. Similarly, “white ignorance” should not be taken to 
assume a Black-white racial binary; rather, I expect white ignorance to be found across contexts 
in which non-white racial groups are oppressed.  
 
2. The Willful Ignorance View 
The first view I will consider is the Willful Ignorance View. On this view, an individual 
is white ignorant just in case they are willfully ignorant about matters pertaining to race and 
racial inequality as a result of implicitly or explicitly trying to protect their psychological interest 
in seeing themself as a good person in a mostly just world, while simultaneously trying to protect 
the material benefits they receive as a result of white racial domination (e.g. income, wealth, 
access to resources, social power, credibility).15 The particular processes by which individuals 
maintain this willful ignorance may vary (e.g. avoiding relevant evidence,16 failing to acquire 
interpretive resources,17 or refusing to considering relevant issues18). But importantly, on the 
																																																																		
15 This view is most clearly articulated in (Spelman, 2007), Medina (2013), (Bailey, 2017), 
(Woomer, 2019). This line of thought is also found in (Charles W. Mills, 1999), (Moody-Adams, 
1994) and (Pohlhaus Jr, 2012).	
16 (Woomer, 2019).	
17 (Pohlhaus Jr, 2012), (Woomer, 2019).	
18 (Moody-Adams, 1994), (Spelman, 2007).	
   
 
Willful Ignorance View, white ignorance is the result of moves that white individuals make to 
avoid inconvenient truths about race and racial inequality. 
 
Assessment of the Willful Ignorance View 
Benefits of the Willful Ignorance View 
First, the Willful Ignorance View can account for why ignorance about racial matters is 
so widespread (1a), and in particular why it is so widespread among whites (1b): white 
individuals have a psychological and material interest in not knowing about the realities of white 
racial domination. Knowing the truth would make it more psychologically difficult to continue 
participating and benefitting from the processes that uphold their dominant status. As a result, 
they resist coming to know about these things, resulting in the observed patterns of ignorance. 
Second, the Willful Ignorance View also helps to make sense of the activeness of white 
ignorance (1d) and the persistence and stability of white racial domination (2). In general, 
ignorance about the realities of white racial domination would be expected to help preserve white 
racial domination by making it far less likely that the status quo will be challenged. But further, 
the willfulness of white ignorance both accounts for its resilience— because they do not want to 
know, people continue to be willfully ignorant even in the face of evidence and argumentation— 
and helps to account for the stability of white racial domination. It is not just that people do not 
recognize that there is a problem— and therefore do nothing to change it— but they refuse to 
recognize that there is a problem, and therefore implicitly refuse to do anything about it. Thus, 
the Willful Ignorance View can help account for the stability of white racial domination. 
 
Costs of the Willful Ignorance View 
   
 
But despite these virtues, the Willful Ignorance View has considerable shortcomings. The 
Willful Ignorance View struggles to make sense of why non-white individuals are also white 
ignorant (1b), as well as why the form and contents of individuals’ ignorance have tended to 
match over time (1c). Further, the Willful Ignorance View fails to provide explanatory coverage, 
making it overly narrow (3).  
First, the Willful Ignorance view would seem to exclude non-white white ignorance: for 
one, it is white individuals who experience the tension between wanting to retain their sense of 
being good people and continuing to reap the benefits of white racial domination, and further, the 
focus on the literature is explicitly on dominant agents.19 Yet it is not just white individuals who 
participate in these epistemic patterns—  for instance, 30% of Black Americans think that being 
Black either helps or doesn’t hurt people’s ability to get ahead in the U.S. these days.20 The 
Willful Ignorance view, as represented in the literature, does not account for this. Still, one could 
depart from the literature and more broadly consider how psychological and material interests 
could, to some extent, incentivize non-white individuals to be white ignorant. After all, it is 
psychologically difficult to reckon with being a victim of systemic injustice, and non-white 
individuals may be materially rewarded by dominant agents for ignoring the realities of white 
racial domination. Broadening the view in this way might enable it to account for the 
demographic patterns we observe.  
Second, it is not clear that the Willful Ignorance View can account for the ways in which 
so many individuals, both white and non-white, have tended to converge on the same forms of 
ignorance over time (e.g. from widespread false beliefs that Black people are naturally servile to 
widespread false beliefs that Black culture is to blame for racial disparities). The general worry is 
																																																																		
19 (Charles W. Mills, 1999), (Spelman, 2007), (Pohlhaus Jr, 2012), (Medina, 2013), (Bailey, 
2017), (Woomer, 2019).	
20 (J. M. Horowitz & Livingston, 2016).	
   
 
that are many ways of being ignorant about some matter: one could ignore the matter altogether, 
insist that the evidence is inconclusive and suspend judgment, or take on any of a large number 
of false beliefs. As such, merely appealing to an individual’s interest in being ignorant about 
some matter cannot explain why they are ignorant in the particular way they are.  
Still, one may suggest an expansion of the Willful Ignorance View that says that in 
addition to a general interest in avoiding the truth about white racial domination, there also more 
particular social practices that incentivize certain forms of ignorance over others. For example, it 
could be said that biologically-racist views have fallen out of favor, such that one faces social 
costs for espousing these views. With enough practices like this, individuals could be 
incentivized to be ignorant in particular ways.  
From a purely theoretical perspective, appealing to these more fine-grained practices 
could account for convergence, albeit by further expanding the view beyond what is seen in the 
literature. Nonetheless, it is dubious that the account in fact accounts for convergence across the 
board. For instance, consider various widespread, false, limiting stereotypes about non-white 
social groups— for example, that Black women are angry and aggressive, and that Latinas are 
feisty. While it is plausible that individuals will have an interest in believing some limiting 
characterization of non-white agents (so as to rationalize existing material inequalities without 
recognizing that there is some form of systemic injustice at play), it is not clear that individuals 
have an interest in believing these limiting characterizations— why angry instead of timid? Why 
feisty instead of lazy? There do not seem to be social practices that explain this convergence by 
incentivizing individuals to have these false beliefs over others (although, as we will see in the 
next section, there are practices that would explain this convergence in other ways). This 
suggests that there is a failure of explanatory coverage here— there are important patterns of 
   
 
ignorance whose explanation is not covered by the Willful Ignorance View. 
For another example indicating that the Willful Ignorance View fails to provide 
explanatory coverage (3), consider the following case:21 
[Racial Exclusion] Like many Americans, Rebecca believes the popular patriotic 
narrative that America is a land of opportunity that has historically welcomed all 
people, regardless of race or creed. However, she does not know that it was not until 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that it became possible for non-white 
residents to become naturalized citizens, or that this same act reinforced a system of 
racial immigration quotas, capping the immigration of persons descended from the 
“Asia-Pacific triangle” to only 2,000 per year.22 
 
Racial Exclusion reflects a paradigmatic instance of white ignorance and so, to satisfy 3b, 
an account of white ignorance should be able to adequately cover its explanation. However, 
merely attributing Rebecca’s ignorance to motivated reasoning or individual avoidance misses a 
significant part of the story: faulty educational practices. Depending on how old Rebecca is, we 
can grant that there is a willful component here. But this is insufficient. Adequately explaining 
Rebecca’s ignorance also requires appealing to social practices that propagate the patriotic 
narrative and obscure the history that goes against the narrative. Thus, even if we were to grant 
that the Willful Ignorance View can identify this as a case of white ignorance, the account is too 




21 There are similar cases in other contexts. King Leopold II, for example, saw to it that records 
of Belgian atrocities in the Congo were destroyed or kept closed even to state officials for nearly 
a century (Ewans, 2003, p. 170).	
22 See ("Public Law 82-414," 1952).	
   
 
3. The Cognitivist View 
The second view I will consider is the Cognitivist View. The Cognitivist View is my 
reconstruction of what I take to be the most dominant view (and, in particular, Mills’ view.)23  
On the Cognitivist View, white ignorance is ignorance that results from faulty reasoning, 
where, importantly, the faulty reasoning is explained by social practices that affect agents’ 
reasoning about racial matters.24 As such, on the Cognitivist View, white ignorance is the result 
of some cognitive error that results from having one’s mental processes shaped by epistemically 
defective social practices. 
There are various ways in which social practices can set individuals up for epistemic 
failure in accordance with the Cognitivist View. Social practices may: promote faulty norms of 
reasoning that individuals mistakenly take to be valid;25 cast false premises (e.g. “natives are 
savages”) as “common knowledge;”26 leave agents hermeneutically impoverished for 
recognizing the injustice at play;27 set agents up for prejudiced testimonial sensibilities, so that 
they take marginalized knowers with insights about their oppression to be less credible than they 
actually are; or incentivize individuals to engage in motivated reasoning and avoidance. What 
unifies these is the idea that there are a variety of social practices that affect how individuals 
think and reason about matters of racial injustice in a way that makes it more likely that agents 
will get things wrong. On the Cognitivist View, white ignorance is ignorance that results from 
																																																																		
23 Mills characterizes white ignorance as a “structural group-based miscognition,” (C. Mills, 
2007, p. 13) a “group-based cognitive handicap,” (C. Mills, 2007, p. 15) “a cognitive tendency,” 
(C. Mills, 2007, p. 23) and “a cognitive orientation to the world” (Charles W Mills, 2015, p. 
218). All but one of his examples involve social practices that directly affect agents’ cognitive 
processes.	
24 Some may prefer to call this the “Ideological View.” I avoid this because it raises substantive 
questions about, e.g., how ideology is best understood.	
25 (Alcoff, 2007)	
26 (Charles W Mills, 2015, p. 218).	
27 (C. Mills, 2007, p. 27), (Medina, 2013)	
   
 
just such cognition-affecting practices. 
 
Assessment of the Cognitivist View 
Benefits of the Cognitivist View 
First, the Cognitivist View is better able to explain convergence with respect to the form 
and contents that white ignorance takes (1c). The view can explain why individuals tend to go 
wrong in the same ways by noting that social practices will tend to supply individuals with 
roughly the same faulty cognitive resources. Moreover, as those social practices evolve, so do 
the contents of the false beliefs that people tend to hold, thereby explaining inter-personal 
convergence over time.  
Similarly, the appeal to social practices helps explain demographic patterns (1b). The 
Cognitivist View can explain non-white white ignorance by noting that marginalized individuals 
can be socialized into practices that are contrary to their interests, while also noting that 
marginalized knowers will tend to have better access to contravening evidence, and thereby be 
better positioned (and so more likely) to escape the grip of these epistemically-defective social 
practices.28 
Further, the Cognitivist View offers a richer explanation of the resilience of white 
ignorance (1d) because it can point to particular ideological resources that help white ignorant 
agents dismiss arguments and explain away evidence.29 This not only adds an important layer to 
the challenges one must face when attempting to eradicate white ignorance— and so better helps 
account for the stability of white racial domination (2b)— but also suggests ideas for practical 
																																																																		
28 (Toole, 2019).	
29 (Begby, 2013), (Dotson, 2018).	
   
 
intervention (e.g. engaging in conceptual engineering,30 casting doubt on “common sense” 
background assumptions, and critiquing defective “norms.”) 
Finally, the Cognitivist View is more explanatorily complete (3). Again, part of what 
explains Rebecca’s ignorance in Racial Exclusion is repeated exposure to the patriotic narrative 
that America is a land that welcomes all. The Cognitivist View, but not the Willful Ignorance 
View, is able to capture this. 
 
Costs of the Cognitivist View 
Although the Cognitivist View has significant advantages over the Willful Ignorance 
View, the view also has significant shortcomings.  
First and most foremost, it is still too explanatorily narrow (3b), because it overlooks 
social practices that promote domination-sustaining patterns of ignorance without directly 
affecting agents’ cognitive processes. 
Recall Racial Exclusion. To adequately cover what is going on in the case, we must not 
only capture the fact that social practices supply Rebecca with false premises, but also the fact 
that she is affected by upstream processes of historic erasure. Specifically, she is affected by 
institutional policies that have curated the contents of her curriculum so as to exclude lessons 
about institutional racism. These practices promote Rebecca’s ignorance, not by supplying her 
with faulty premises or norms of reasoning, but by keeping important information away from her 
and her peers— or at least, making it more difficult to access. These practices don’t work by 
intervening on Rebecca’s reasoning. Rather, these practices intervene upstream of her cognitive 
processes by shaping what information is available for her to reason about to begin with. The 
Cognitivist View cannot capture this second, significant explanatory dimension. 
																																																																		
30 (Haslanger, 2000), (Burgess & Plunkett, 2013a, 2013b), (Cappelen, 2018)	
   
 
While I take the failure of explanatory coverage to be the most decisive critique of the 
Cognitivist View, there are two more minor criticisms that are worth mentioning. First, note that 
the Cognitivist View falls short when explaining the form that individuals’ ignorance takes. 
While it can explain why it is that individuals have certain false beliefs, and plausibly also why 
they suspend judgment in particular cases, the account has a harder time explaining why 
individuals lack beliefs about certain subjects altogether. Consider not Rebecca’s false belief 
about her country’s historical attitude toward non-white immigrants, but her lack of belief about 
the racist immigration policies. The Cognitivist View cannot explain why she lacks beliefs about 
these matters, because this is not the result of faulty cognitive resources.31 
 
4. The Structuralist View 
We have seen that a major failing of both the Willful Ignorance View and the Cognitivist 
View is a failure to account for the variety of ways in which social practices can promote 
ignorance—  not just by creating conditions that incentivize willful ignorance, nor influencing 
what goes on in agents’ minds, but also, for instance, by creating external barriers to knowledge. 
To address these failures of explanatory coverage, I propose the Structuralist View. 
On the Structuralist View, white ignorance refers to ignorance that, first, systematically 
arises as part of some social structural process(es) that systematically gives rise to racial 
injustice. This is similar to the Cognitivist and Willful Ignorance Views insofar as these each 
identify one such class of social structural processes. But the Structuralist View is more general: 
it is not limited to social practices that give rise to ignorance and social injustice by way of 
cognition-affecting social practices, nor to social practices that give rise to ignorance and social 
																																																																		
31 The Cognitivist View can however explain a lack of belief if it is due to norms or concepts that 
direct agents’ attention.	
   
 
injustice by way of incentivizing individuals to ignore these injustices; rather, it is open to any 
kind of social structural process.  
Second, the Structuralist View also requires that the ignorance that arises through these 
processes is not an incidental by-product of these processes, but is rather an active player in 
them. That is, it must be, at least in part, through their systematic epistemic effects that these 
social structural processes systematically contribute to and help sustain white racial domination. 
To illustrate these ideas, consider the following case:  
[Overburdened] By virtue of unfair gender norms, Dr. Grey is constantly 
overburdened by service work. Although she knows that she ought to keep up with 
the latest medical research, she decides to forego reading the most recent issue of the 
journal she usually reads. As it happens, this issue revealed an important new 
treatment for sickle cell anemia (a condition that predominantly affects patients of 
African and Afro-Caribbean descent in the U.K.). 
 
Dr. Grey’s ignorance is a result of a social structural process (i.e. the enforcement of 
gender norms) and results in a racial disparity: she is able to offer her white patients, but not her 
Black patients, the best treatment available for their ailments. But, although this disparity is 
significant, unfortunate, and plausibly unjust, Dr. Grey’s ignorance does not amount to white 
ignorance on the Structuralist View: the gender norms at play do not systematically give rise to 
racial injustice, and it is only incidentally that they give rise to ignorance that contributes to 
racial injustice in this case. Contrast this with a version in which she neglected to read this 
particular issue because of norms that de-prioritize the wellness of patients of color. In this 
version, Dr. Grey’s ignorance and the resulting disparities are not coincidental, but result from a 
norm that systematically makes people of color worse off, in part by systematically incentivizing 
   
 
people like Dr. Grey to remain ignorant about how to best treat their patients of color.  
This characterization of the Structuralist View clearly relies on intuitive notions like 
“systematically arising” and “incidental by-product.” Although I am happy to import whatever 
the best account of these intuitive notions might be, one way to flesh these out is to anchor them 
to Cummins’ conception of functional analysis. (Cummins, 1975) rejects two standard 
assumptions about functional analysis and explanation:  
(a) The point of functional analysis is to explain the presence or existence of F (e.g. why do 
mammals have hearts?) 
(b) What it is for F to perform function f is for F to have certain effects on a containing system 
that contribute to some feature or activity of the containing system. (E.g. what it is for the heart to 
perform the function of pumping blood is for it to have certain effects (viz. blood-pumping) that 
contribute to the survival of the body) 
 Instead, Cummins’ idea is that what functional analysis helps us do is to break down a 
complex system into the product of several, simpler processes:  
(a’) the point of functional analysis is to explain the capacities of containing systems  
(b’) F’s function in a containing system is to ϕ iff F has the capacity to ϕ and F's ϕ-ing is part of 
an adequate account of how the containing system is able to ψ 
 
To return to white ignorance, then, the proposal is, first, to consider white racial domination as a 
global property of a social system (the containing system) that arises through the joint activity of 
a variety of social structures (and social structural processes) that, together, help us to better 
understand how it is that white racial domination persists. Although I do not have the space to 
present or defend my preferred account of social structure in detail, I am operating with a picture 
of social structure that includes both institutions— networks made up of roles (filled by 
   
 
individuals) and relations between roles that are governed by rules (e.g. governments, 
universities, and banks)32 — and culture, or networks of cultural schemas (e.g. beliefs, concepts, 
attitudes) that are widely internalized through processes of socialization and coordinate us in 
resource management, as well as the social norms and practices that emerge from widespread 
internalization of these schemas.33 As such, the practices and processes that the Cognitivist and 
Willful Ignorance Views appeal to are social structural processes on this view, as are practices 
like historic erasure and housing segregation. Then, within this framework, the Structuralist 
View proposes that we take the ignorance that plays a role in any variety of these social 
structural processes— that is, whatever ignorance is part of the explanation of how one or more 
social structural processes play/s its/their role in explaining how the social system is able to 
sustain a state of white racial domination— to be white ignorance. 
More formally, for some social system S, denote the social structures that make up S by si 
(for some i) and denote the activities that each si engages in by ɸi, j (for some j).34 Then 
(Structuralist View) A’s ignorance of ψ will be an instance of white ignorance iff A’s ignorance 
is (in part) the result of at least one process ɸi,j such that:  
(1) ɸi,j systematically helps give rise to white racial domination in S  AND 
(2) ɸi,j does so (at least in part) by (systematically) promoting ignorance of ψ    
 
where ɸi, j "systematically helps give rise to white racial domination" if ɸi, j regularly has certain 
effects and its having those effects is part of an adequate explanation of the existence or 
persistence of white racial domination. Condition (2), in turn, will be satisfied when causing or 
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34 The i and j indices are to accommodate the fact that there may be multiple social structures, 
each of which may be involved in multiple processes that help give rise to white racial 
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probabilifying ignorance of ψ is part of these “regular effects” of ɸi, j. In this way, the intuitive 
notions of “systematically giving rise to” and being an “incidental by-product” are understood in 
terms of regularity and explanatory power.  
 
Core Benefits of the Structuralist View 
First, note that, because the Structuralist View encompasses the structural processes 
appealed to by both the Cognitivist and Willful Ignorance Views, the Structuralist View inherits 
their benefits when it comes to satisfying the core desiderata. But it can also do better: it can also 
appeal to, e.g., social practices that make key evidence difficult to obtain in order to help account 
for white ignorance being widespread (1a); it can appeal to social processes like housing 
segregation that systematically distance dominantly situated knowers, but not marginalized 
knowers, from evidence about racial injustice to better account for demographic patterns (1b); 
and it can appeal to a variety of practices to better account for the different forms that 
widespread ignorance takes— e.g. it can appeal to social practices that distribute faulty cognitive 
resources to account for convergence around certain false beliefs, and it can also appeal to 
cognitively upstream, evidence-distancing practices to better account for a widespread lack of 
belief about certain matters (1c).  
But the Structuralist View’s greatest advantage is explanatory coverage (3). As 
previously discussed, there are key elements of Racial Exclusion that neither the Cognitivist 
View nor the Willful Ignorance View is able to capture. Although these views might be able to 
identify Racial Exclusion as an instance of white ignorance, and so get the verdict right, they do 
not make room for crucial parts of the explanation— specifically, practices of historic erasure. 
The Structuralist View, in contrast, does: historical erasure is a social structural process that (a) 
   
 
systematically give rise to racial injustice, and (b) does so in part by systematically giving rise to 
ignorance of the sort that Rebecca experiences.  
The point is even clearer in the following case, where the explanatory limitations of the 
Cognitivist and Willful Ignorance Views lead to (what I argue is) an extensional inadequacy 
(2a): 
[Precision Medicine] Dr. Mejilla knows that genome-wide association studies 
(GWAS) have shown that the safety and effectiveness of the drug tamoxifen depends 
on a patient’s genetic profile. However, because GWAS have been conducted 
primarily on European populations, Dr. Mejilla does not know whether her 
Indigenous Latina patient, Yusimí, will be able to safely metabolize the drug. 
 
First, note that Dr. Mejilla’s ignorance about the likely effects of tamoxifen on patients 
like Yusimí forms part of a larger pattern of ignorance among medical professionals. Note also 
that Dr. Mejilla’s ignorance is not attributable to faulty cognitive practices, nor is it willful 
ignorance on her part. Rather, the problem is that GWAS have been conducted primarily on 
European populations. According to a 2009 analysis, 96% of participants in GWAS were of 
European descent, and as of 2016, fewer than 5% of GWAS participants are like Yusimí— that 
is, of African, Indigenous, or mixed ancestry.35 Researchers point to three key factors to explain 
the European bias in GWAS.36 First, it is preferable to build on existing data sets and patient 
cohorts for studies of this kind, so that historical biases are perpetuated by methodological 
norms. Second, people of color face disproportionate barriers in access to medical care and 
medical centers, which limit their ability to participate in studies. Third, communities of color 
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have historically been subject to abuse by the medical community, generating distrust and an 
unwillingness to participate when the option is available.37  
To show that the Structuralist View can accommodate the case, I will focus on the second 
factor: the barriers to medical access. These barriers have obvious concrete consequences that 
help constitute white racial domination— they help create a medical system in which people of 
color systematically receive worse medical treatment than their white counterparts. But, 
importantly, these barriers also systematically contribute to white racial domination through the 
kinds of epistemic upshots that we see in Precision Medicine. Insofar as these barriers give rise 
to patterns of ignorance of this kind, they make it such that even when people of color are able to 
access medical care, they still fail to receive fair treatment. This creates systematic disparities 
between white and non-white patients that help constitute a system of white racial domination. 
Thus (a) the ignorance results as part of a process that systematically gives rise to racial injustice 
and ignorance of this kind, and (b) the ignorance is an active, systematic player in this process.  
Further, I argue, it is important to include cases like this in our account of white 
ignorance, even if it is likely not what first come to mind when one hears “white ignorance.” It is 
crucial to realize that we systematically fail people of color, not just in terms of medical access 
and treatment, but, even more fundamentally, in terms of medical knowledge. Recognizing the 
epistemic and practical effects of these processes is important to understanding the epistemic 
dimension of white racial domination, as well as the way in which white racial domination 
sustains itself— and this is just what an account of white ignorance is meant to shed light on.  
Finally, the Structuralist View’s advantage with respect to explanatory coverage (3) 
translates into further advantages when it comes to explaining the resilience of white ignorance 
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(1d) and the persistence of white racial domination (2b). To see this, compare the pictures of 
active ignorance that fall out of each view. On the Cognitivist View, active ignorance is 
characterized primarily in agential terms: the actively ignorant agent is one who avoids changing 
their beliefs even when directly faced with evidence that contradicts their views by, e.g., 
explaining away evidence or derailing conversations.38 They may be shaped by their social 
environment as suggested by the Willful Ignorance View, and they may draw on tools provided 
by their social milieu as suggested by the Cognitivist View, but ultimately, active ignorance is a 
matter of the actively ignorant agent performing certain actions such as to preserve their 
ignorance. Active ignorance is thus primarily agential on the traditional view. 
On my picture, the activeness of white ignorance is not understood agentially, but rather 
as a matter of there being barriers, or defense mechanisms, that “protect” it. The analogy to a 
castle under siege is helpful here. On one level, individual inhabitants can wield personal 
weapons to defend themselves in close combat. On another level, there are soldiers that enact 
coordinated maneuvers that help prevent situations in which individual inhabitants need to draw 
their swords. On yet another level, the inhabitants are protected by key structural features of the 
castle, such as the moat, the drawbridge, and the thick castle walls; even the geography of the 
land plays a role in defending the castle. Each of these levels acts as a significant layer of 
protection for the inhabitants, and these layers often operate simultaneously. Similarly, on the 
Structuralist View, there are multiple kinds of defense mechanisms for active ignorance, some of 
which involve action on behalf of the white ignorant agent, and others which act upstream of the 
individual. 
To fully understand how it is that these patterns of domination-sustaining ignorance are 
protected, it is important to recognize the variety of structural factors that play a role in 
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promoting and sustaining both white ignorance and white racial domination, often 
simultaneously. The Structuralist View, but not the Cognitivist or Willful Ignorance views, 
makes room for the necessary nuance and complexity. As such, the Structuralist View better 
accounts for both the resilience of white ignorance (1d) and the persistence of white racial 
domination (2b). 
 
Additional Benefits of the Structuralist View 
I have argued that the appeal to general social structural processes gives the Structuralist 
View the power to account for patterns of ignorance that are supported by multiple, diverse 
social practices. This gives rise to a characterization of the activeness of white ignorance that 
better accounts for the robustness of white ignorance and white racial domination: it is not 
merely a matter of individual agents willfully resisting knowledge and progress; rather there is a 
complex, layered system that promotes ignorance and, partly in so doing, generates and stabilizes 
white racial domination.  
 What gives the view the power needed to secure these core benefits, while also providing 
needed flexibility, is its abstractness. The Structuralist View is not a simple disjunctive view—it 
does not merely add to the Cognitivist and Willful Ignorance Views the specification that white 
ignorance is ignorance that either arises from the kinds of practices that the Willful Ignorance 
View identifies, or from the kinds of practices that the Cognitivist View identifies, or from 
practices that systematically limit evidential access. Instead, the Structuralist View makes a 
general appeal to social structural processes that includes, but is not limited to, ignorance-
incentivizing, cognition-affecting, and evidence-obscuring practices. 
With some important caveats, I take the abstractness to be a significant advantage of the 
   
 
view. For one, it provides the explanatory power described above— it is able to capture the 
various layered social structural processes involved in bringing about domination-sustaining 
ignorane. At the same time, the general appeal to social structures gives the view important 
flexibility: it allows the view to not only capture current nuances and complexities, but also the 
possible evolution of those nuances and complexities. For instance, we have already observed a 
shift from explicitly racist ideology and de jure racist policies, to colorblind ideology and de 
facto racist policies. The power and flexibility that come with the abstractness of the view allow 
us to track these changes. This also allows the view to avoid the worry that normative analyses 
will tend to oversimplify the problems they seek to address— the view makes room for the 
complexity of white racial domination over time. 
Importantly— and this brings me to the caveats— the generality of the view should not 
be treated as an end point, but should rather be viewed as a starting point for inquiring into the 
details of white ignorance and white racial domination at any given time. The general reference 
to social structural processes should prompt us to consider not only which of the processes that 
we are already familiar with might be playing a role in white ignorance, but also whether 
processes that we have not yet have considered might be involved. So long as it is accompanied 
by inquiry into the concrete details, the abstractness of the structuralist view allows us not only 
to better understand what is happening now, but also keeps us alert to new, or previously 
unconsidered, possibilities. In so doing, it is a valuable tool for conceptualizing the epistemic 
dimensions of white racial domination.  
 
Costs of the Structuralist View 
I have spent considerable time articulating what I take to be the main benefits of the 
   
 
structuralist view. But the fact that the view has considerable benefits does not mean it is 
altogether costless.  
I have already alluded to one cost of the Structuralist View: because of its generality, the 
structuralist view of white ignorance shifts much of the burden of filling out a precise picture of 
white ignorance to the user. Although I have done some work to show how we might fill in some 
of these details in the current context through my discussion, gains in explanatory coverage (3b) 
come at the cost of loss of detail when explaining how exactly social practices give rise to white 
ignorance. This is in contrast to the Willful Ignorance View and Cognitivist Views, which 
reference more specific mechanisms of motivated reasoning, distorted reasoning, and avoidance 
in order to flesh out a more concrete picture of white ignorance. There is a necessary trade-off 
here. The more specific and concrete the view, the better it reflects the pressing problems of here 
and now— but also the more likely it is to exclude important but as-yet-unconsidered factors, 
and to struggle to capture the problems of tomorrow. Because I take it that figuring out the 
details of white ignorance and white racial domination is anyhow going to be a matter of 
continual inquiry, I take this cost to be well worth the benefit of providing a powerful and 
flexible template for this inquiry. 
Another cost is that, in shifting the focus away from individual agents, it (like the 
Cognitivist View) makes ascriptions of blame less straightforward, and dulls the blow of calling 
someone white ignorant. However, it should be noted that the view does not rule out individual 
responsibility. There can still be cases where agents are culpably ignorant, because (for example) 
they have engaged in motivated reasoning or failed to pursue inquiries they should have pursued. 
Further, there are conceptual tools one can draw on to regain rhetorical force— for instance, by 
claiming that someone is willfully (or culpably) white ignorant.  
   
 
Moreover, I think that there are associated benefits that help offset these costs. 
Pragmatically, the shift away from individual intention and agency helps prevent discussions of 
white ignorance from becoming bogged down in debates about the motivations of individual 
agents. By shifting attention to the ways in which individuals’ ignorance contributes to these 
structural problems, the view allows for a more forward-looking approach that can sidestep 
questions about individual’s characters when it is more important to focus on the fact that there is 
a problem that needs correcting.39 
More theoretically, the structuralist view calls for a shift from thinking solely in terms of 
individual responsibility, to also considering collective and shared responsibility.40 Thinking 
about willful ignorance is helpful here. While willful ignorance (much like active ignorance) is 
traditionally spelled out in terms of an individual agent who, in some sense, chooses to be 
ignorant, our discussion of white ignorance suggests that this picture can and should be 
complicated in various ways.41 First, the structuralist view reveals ways in which social 
structural processes can facilitate an individual’s willful ignorance by making information (e.g. 
information about redlining or police brutality) more difficult to obtain (e.g. through historic 
erasure or housing segregation). For example, while Rebecca from Racial Exclusion may avoid 
doing research in order to avoid knowing the truth about racial oppression, it is significant that 
our social practices make it easy for her to avoid becoming acquainted with the relevant 
information. Our practices should make willful ignorance about racial oppression difficult to 
maintain, when instead they make such ignorance easy to cultivate and sustain. Insofar as we 
contribute to processes that facilitate individuals’ willful ignorance, it would seem that we share 
a responsibility to transform our practices. Relatedly, insofar as we, collectively, approve and 
																																																																		
39 (Young, 2006), (Zheng, 2018a, 2018b)	
40 (Young, 2006), (Medina, 2013)	
41 (Lynch, 2016), (Wieland, 2017)	
   
 
implement the social practices that underpin white ignorance, it is plausible that we, collectively, 
are willfully ignorant as a result (and so have a collective responsibility to change our practices). 
This is both practically and theoretically significant. It is practically significant insofar as 
recognition of shared and collection responsibility should help to spur action to address these 
problems. But it is also theoretically significant insofar as it forces us to rethink and expand 
traditional conceptions of willful ignorance in order to make room for these nuances. Thus, 
because it helps to bring the importance of shared and collective responsibility into greater relief, 
the shift in focus away from individual agency comes with practical and theoretical benefits that 
help offset the cost of complicating ascriptions of individual responsibility. 
Ultimately, there is a question of what one takes to be of greater importance. As I have 
indicated, I take the central aim of providing an account of white ignorance to be to help us 
better understand the mechanisms that sustain white racial domination, so that we may 
strategically intervene to remedy racial injustice. As such, I take explanatory power to be more 
important than ascribing blame in this context. This is not to deny that we will need an account 
of responsibility. As part of our theory-building around (racial) oppression, we will need a 
forward-looking account of responsibility that tells us what parts we, as individuals occupying 
particular social locations, and we, as a collective(s), are to play in remedying structural 
injustice. But I take this to be a separate and more general part of the overarching project— one 
that should be informed, in part, by an account of white ignorance that best helps us to 
understand what it is that needs to be remedied. At this stage, what we need is an account of 
white ignorance that helps us to best diagnose the epistemic dimensions of the problem of racial 
oppression, and I have argued that the Structuralist View is the best account on offer to do that. 
 
   
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have completed three main tasks for the purpose of determining how we 
should develop the notion of white ignorance. First, I have identified four core desiderata for an 
account of white ignorance that consider what such an account would have to accomplish in 
order to satisfy the theoretical and political aims of a critical, liberatory project focused on the 
epistemic dimensions of racial oppression. Second, I have mapped out three views of white 
ignorance, two of which are reconstructed from the literature (viz. the Willful Ignorance and 
Cognitivist views), and the third which is my own novel contribution. Third, I have considered 
the strengths and weaknesses of each of these views, in order to determine which we should use 
to develop our understanding of ‘white ignorance.’ 
Ultimately, I have argued that the Structuralist View is to be preferred. This is because 
the Structuralist View best helps us to explain the patterns of ignorance that we observe, the 
persistence of racial inequality, and the connections between white ignorance and white racial 
domination. The benefits of the Structuralist View arise from its power and flexibility. The view 
is powerful because it allows that many, diverse kinds of social structures can play a role in 
giving rise to white ignorance and white racial domination. This, in turn, allows it to better 
account for both the patterns of ignorance that we observe today, and the persistence of racial 
inequality. The Structuralist View is flexible because it does not restrict the kinds of structural 
processes that can play a role in white ignorance, but instead refers to abstract social structures. 
This, in turn, allows the view to capture the ways in which the structures that support white 
ignorance and white racial domination have shifted, and may continue to shift, over time, while 
also ensuring that the view is neither overly narrow nor paints an overly rosy picture of the 
problem to be resolved. Together, this power and flexibility mean that the Structuralist View 
   
 
performs better than the alternatives when it comes to fulfilling the explanatory roles of white 
ignorance, and provides a valuable tool for conceptualizing and practically reasoning about white 
ignorance and white racial domination. As such, I conclude that our notion of white ignorance 
should be a Structuralist one. 
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